game." For example, Stigum (1983) reports that dealers often finance less than the value of their Treasury bill purchases, relying on fails to cover the difference.
We will argue that the length of the fail, should it occur, is variable and known at the time the order is placed. This lets us conduct regression tests of its significance using the opportunity cost of the fail as an explanatory variable. Since the delivery mechanism operates only when markets are open, fails can be corrected only when markets are open. Market closings, therefore, take on a special importance for our work.
Although the United States Treasury's change to a book-entry system for government securities has reduced the probability of fails, the large sums involved with delivery failures remain an important issue among market participants. However, fails have not yet generated much interest in the literature. This might be due to the relative lack of daily return data on debt securities. The issue is still important for several reasons, both from the perspective of regulatory policy and for our understanding of financial markets. First, as noted above, fails generate transfers from losers of the fails game to winners. Dealers in total neither win nor lose, but very large transfers could conceivably wipe out a dealer's capital, causing bankruptcy and market disruptions.
Second, Gilbert (1989) shows that fails contribute to the problem of daylight overdrafts, which are intraday deficits incurred by a customer at his clearing bank, or by a bank with the Federal Reserve.
To see how fails lead to daylight overdrafts, consider a dealer who must make delivery on two orders by the end of the day, one for $5 million and one for $25 million. Suppose that at noon he has $10 million worth of the security in inventory. He can fill the smaller order immediately, but instead will choose to wait until the last moment. This is because he may take delivery of other bills later that day. If these deliveries amount to $15 million, he can add it to the $10 million already in inventory and fill the $25 million order. At worst, he fails on the smaller trade. If, however, he fills the $5 million trade early in the day, receiving the $15 million order does him no good --he still must fail on the $25 million order.
Other market procedures combine with this practice to generate daylight overdrafts. Securities financed via repurchase agreements (repos) are returned early in the day, and the clearing bank must transfer funds to the rep0 investor at that time. Because funds are transferred from the dealers' accounts early in the day and because dealers deliver securities late in the day, dealers must overdraw their accounts with their clearing banks by large amounts in the interim.
Banks protect themselves by obtaining liens on the securities. If the dealer becomes insolvent, the bank takes the collateral.
Because it involves only the clearing bank and the dealer, such an insolvency does not necessarily pose a problem for the Federal Reserve.
However, Gilbert (1989) points out that when the rep0 investor returns securities to the dealer early in the day and the clearing bank returns funds to that investor on behalf of the dealer, the clearing bank's account with the Federal Reserve is overdrawn; a daylight overdraft is created at the Federal Reserve. Further, the funds transfer is final and cannot be reversed. If the bank suffers large losses on its other assets and becomes insolvent, the Federal Reserve has no claim on the securities transferred to the dealer in the morning, and loses on the daylight overdraft. The danger of large losses by the Federal Reserve (and ultimately, by taxpayers) is magnified by the dealer's efforts to build inventory to avoid fails.
A third reason fails are important is that daily return data using securities subject to failed delivery can show a systematic return pattern, because the value of being failed varies systematically with the length of market closings. If fails are ignored, tests using these ' data may be biased. Fourth, if fails are priced, they contribute to the more general weekly pattern identified by Gibbons and Hess (1981) and Flannery and Protopapadakis (1988) . This also means tests of the importance of fails must control for a more general weekly pattern.
Finally, fails can conceivably contribute to variation in the bid-ask spread because they represent another source of risk for market makers: dealers often buy from one trader and sell the same security to another. The dealer may receive delivery on time, but too late in the day to deliver the security to the second trader, causing an expensive fail. Under such circumstances, dealers may not make a trade without a larger bid-ask spread. Because the cost of a fail is a function of its length, we conjecture that the bid-ask spread widens as the length of the potential fail increases. Consistent with the view that fails are important, the Federal Reserve has taken preliminary steps toward gathering data on delivery fails. This paper models Treasury-bill holding-period returns as a function of the expected return on an investment in federal funds during the holding period (an important alternative interest rate that is not subject to fails), and the expected opportunity cost during the length of time before a fail can be corrected.* Use of the federal funds rate simplifies the time series specification for our empirical work and helps control for a possible common state variable that might induce a general weekly pattern in short-term rates. The results do not, however, depend on the use of the federal funds rate. Modeling bill returns as a function of the holding period and the length of the potential fail yields substantially similar results.
Our results support the hypothesis that the marginal trader considers failed delivery. Our estimate of the premium for fails is always significant, even after controlling for differences in the weekly seasonal return pattern between Treasury bills and federal funds. In addition, we find that the bid-ask spread does indeed widen when the dealer faces the prospect of a longer fail.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I develops our hypotheses. Section I1 develops the model, linking the effect of failed delivery to market closings. Section I11 describes the data and examines several empirical issues important to our tests. Section IV reports the results. Section V studies variation in the probability of fails, while Section VI studies the effect of fails on the bid-ask spread. Section VII provides a summary.
I. The Importance of Market Closings on the Day after Delivery
Although investors who purchase securities for next-day delivery obtain conditional title to those securities on the trade date, payment in interest-bearing funds does not occur until delivery. These payment delays may be diagramed as follows: If delivery at t+s were certain, Treasury bill prices would be unaffected by the value of D. However, delivery is not certain. This gives D an appealing economic implication. The seller must provide instructions to the clearing bank so that it can deliver the security to the buyer. If the instructions are late or in any way unclear, the clearing bank does not make the transfer. This means that the buyer of the security need not make payment until the fail is corrected.
Nevertheless, payment procedures specify that he owns the security as of the promised settlement date. In essence, he obtains a zero-interest loan for at least one business day, or D calendar days. Clearly, the possibility of correctly anticipating and collecting fails must be valuable to a dealer. There is no penalty if he receives delivery on time, but he need not finance the purchase if he is failed. Rational buyers bid up observed prices to reflect this possibility.
Dealers report that fails are a significant issue. We contacted several dealers; each claimed fails were important. Most focused primarily on their efforts to avoid the cost of failing to make delivery, but noted that the ability to correctly anticipate their customers' failures to deliver was a valuable skill. And, although the proportion of failed trades is now (thanks to book-entry) only 1 or 2 percent, the sheer volume of trade makes the total impact substantial and worthy of study. Stigum (1988) reports total fails to receive for one large dealer average $225 million per day, while his fails to deliver average $200 million per day.
Even if a dealer is not absolutely certain that he will be failed, it can be advantageous for him to take the risk of misguessing his position. For example, a dealer may have purchased 10 blocks of bills of a given maturity, each worth $5 million. Perhaps the dealer is reasonably sure that one of the blocks will fail; he need not know which of the 10. He arranges financing for only nine blocks in the relatively low-cost rep0 market. If he is correct, he need not finance the tenth block, effectively saving the entire cost of the tenth loan. If, however, he is incorrect and all 10 blocks are delivered, the dealer must finance the tenth block at the bank's loan rate, which typically runs 100 basis points above the rep0 rate.
Depending on the dealer's confidence in predicting fails, this may be an acceptable risk. For example, at rat& of 10 percent, the dealer can be incorrect nine times out of 10 and still be ahead. He loses 100 basis points nine times, but earns the entire financing rate --10 percent --the tenth time. Stigum (1988) reports that some top-tier dealers enjoy still better odds. Such dealers may have lines of credit at foreign banks that permit uncollateralized borrowing. These dealers can typically obtain overnight funds late in the day for a smaller spread, increasing the likelihood of winning their gamble. Further, if two of the 10 blocks in the example fail rather than one, the dealer still wins the same amount. He may be forced, in turn, to fail on one of his nine repos, but his loss on this is offset by his gain in being failed. In addition, he still saves the entire financing cost of the tenth block.
In terms of the time diagram above, D represents the minimum time before markets reopen and a fail can be corrected. Clearly, a buyer prefers to be failed on Friday deliveries. In this case, a fail cannot be corrected for at least three calendar days; he receives two extra days' worth of free financing. Since the benefit of being failed is about three times as large on trades for Friday delivery, it follows that the premium, if any, is about three times as large.4 Similar forces operate if t+s falls before a holiday. If the probability of collecting a fail is the same, then the longer the time before a fail can be corrected, the more valuable that potential fail becomes:
Treasury bill prices increase with D.
In summary, if fails are not priced or are too trivial to matter, the delay D has no effect on bill prices. If, however, fails are important, then prices are an increasing function of D.
The Model
This section derives a pricing model that explicitly controls for the possibility that delivery may not be made on time. We do this by incorporating the opportunity cost during the D calendar days from the scheduled delivery date until the next business day into the returngenerating equation for Treasury bills.
We begin by defining PL as the observed price at t of a bill paying one dollar at maturity, if payment and delivery were certain to be made on the delivery date, t+s. Note that although the bill is default-free, P' is not par since the bill does not mature until t+m. PL may be t expressed as:
where Et_n is the expectations operator conditioned on information at t-n, ffn is the continuously compounded return on federal funds during t the n days in the holding period observed at t, 7 is a constant (we relax this assumption later), and E is an error that incorporates information realized at time t. Consistent with the time of our quotes, n is defined in terms of delivery dates. For example, buying on Thursday and selling on Friday generates a cash outflow on Friday and an inflow on Monday, so n equals three. Although n depends on t, we suppress the subscript t to simplify notation. Also, while observations are separated by varying numbers of calendar days, they represent consecutive trading days. We use the federal funds rate because it responds rapidly to changes in economic conditions, is not subject to fails, and is readily available. Both PL and PL-, in equation (1) are observed prices if late-afternoon quotes are directed at traders who deliver as scheduled with probability one --with no chance of failed delivery.
But if the probability of fails is positive, it may well influence prices. To capture the effect of delivery failures, we write P' as a t function of the observed price at time t,
where ffDt is the continuously compounded return on federal funds during the D calendar days from t+s to t+s+D, and S is a proportion. The product (6 x ffD ) is interpreted as the premium or rate of price t adjustment for fails during those D days. We call this the fail premium.
D is important because it represents the number of days before a fail can be corrected. In turn, the variable ffDt is the value, per dollar, of a fail generated by trades made at time t. The parameter 5
represents the proportion of this value that a buyer pays as a premium for the possibility of obtaining an interest-free loan for D days.
Intuitively, equation (2) removes this quantity from the observed price by discounting at the market-determined fail premium during the term of the loan.
In Section V we study the possibility that the proportion of the return on federal funds during the D days in the potential fail period, 6 , varies, but here we assume it is constant. Equation (2) then holds for any t and we can write:
Substituting equations (2) and (3) into equation (1) yields:
Taking logs and rearranging, we obtain:
where AffDt is the difference or change in ffD from t-n to t. With the exception of 7, 6, and E , all variables are observable. Equation (5) says that the observed Treasury bill return depends on the return on an asset not subject to fails, plus an adjustment for fails. More precisely, it is a proportion of the expected return on an investment in federal funds during the holding period, plus the difference in adjustments for potential fails, (6 x AffD ) , plus an error term.
t Our primary regression test equation is, therefore:
In this formulation, bl estimates 7, the average proportion of the federal funds rate earned by Treasury bill investors over the holding period in the absence of fails. The coefficient b estimates 6 , the 2 average proportion of the federal funds return during the potential fail period that buyers pay sellers for the chance to collect fails.
We expect b to be positive: if the federal funds rate is high, 1 bill returns tend to be high. The null hypothesis that investors consider fails in pricing Treasury bills restricts the coefficient b 2 to be positive: if the opportunity cost of today's potential fail is larger than yesterday's, prices are bid up more than yesterday's. Measured returns tend to be high.
Data, Preliminary Tests, and Empirical Issues
A. Data
The appendix contains a detailed description of the data. 
where Bid and Ask are discount quotes in percent and the dummy t t variables dlt through dqt control for the days of the week, excluding ~u e s d a~.~ In this specification, the intercept estimates the spread on Tuesday, while the coefficients b through b4 estimate deviatio.i,s ~r o m 1
Tuesday's spread on the other four days of the week. We test the restriction that each coefficient on the dummy variables is zero using the heteroskedasticity-consistent estimator due to White (1980) . Table 1 shows that none of the coefficients differ statistically from zero. Therefore, we use the mean of the bid and ask quotes in all empirical work. 6 Table 2 Omitting these two observations, the only deviation from the expected rankings is that the mean quote for the days on which D equals one is larger than when it equals two. We interpret this as providing some evidence that investors consider fails in pricing bills.
C. Empirical Issues
A potential problem with equation (6) we must use models such as the error-correction model of Engle and Granger (1987) . To study this we use the unit-root tests of Perron (1988), Phillips (1987) , and Phillips and Perron (1988) . To conduct www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm these tests we estimate three equations using ordinary least squares:
, nr Equation (8) models the series without drift or time trend. Equation (9) allows for drift, and equation (10) Engle and Granger (1987) .
IV. Results
The results in Table 3 imply that the ordinary least squares residuals from equation (6) percent. Conversations with dealers suggest that this is too high; the most common figure mentioned is 1 or 2 percent during our sample period.
This suggests that the model expressed by equation (6) omits an important factor.
In particular, we conjecture that Treasury bill holding-period returns are not a constant proportion of the federal funds rate. Weekly return seasonality has been found in many assets; it is worth testing to see if the relationship between bill returns and returns on federal funds differs on any other days of the week. To formally test this, we regress the log of the price ratio on the return on an investment in federal funds during the holding period and interactive terms for Mondays, Wednesdays, Thursdays, and Fridays. The coefficient on the federal funds investment measures the proportion of the funds rate that bill investors earn on Tuesdays. The four interactive terms measure the deviation from Tuesday's proportion earned by bill investors on those four days. We then test the restriction that these coefficients are zero with a chi-square test using White's (1980) where dgt is unity on Wednesdays and zero otherwise and d is unity on 4t Thursdays and zero otherwise. As in equation (6), bill returns are a function of fails and the return on federal funds, but equation (11) permits the proportion of the return on funds earned by bill investors to differ on Wednesdays and Thursdays. Table 5 reports the results. All Q-statistics are insignificant, and all autocorrelations (not shown) are within two standard errors of zero. The intercept restriction holds. As expected, given the results of the chi-square tests, the coefficients on the interactive terms for Wednesdays and Thursdays are significant. The proportion of the federal funds rate that Treasury bill investors earn differs on Wednesdays and Thursdays. The coefficient b2, measuring the proportion of the federal funds rate paid as compensation for fails, is smaller. The point estimate of 0.0364 implies a delivery failure rate of about 3.64 percent. As noted above, dealers report a failure rate of 1 or 2 percent on bills during our sample. Given that the standard error of the estimate of b2 is 0.0118, a formal t-test fails to reject that our estimate falls well within this range.
The implied rate of failed delivery for the model using a constant is even closer to the failure rate that market participants report. The estimated coefficient b2 is 0.0297, for an implied failure rate of about 2.97 percent.
Our results do not depend on the use of the federal funds rate as a proxy for the opportunity cost of a fail. We also estimate equation (6) without incorporating an interest rate proxy: ~o~( P~/ P~-~) = blnt + b AD + et.
t
In this model, bl estimates the daily holding-period return on Treasury bills, and b2 estimates the rate of compensation for fails.
Both are positive and significant, implying delivery failure rates about the same as the regressions using an interest-rate proxy. These results are not shown for reasons of space, but are available on request.
V. Variation in the Probability of Fails
The tests above assume that the probability of a fail is constant.
This assumption may not be valid, because rational sellers realize that multiday fails are more costly than single-day fails. Because they invest more resources in preventing multiday fails, the probability of fails should decline as the length of the potential fail increases. If preventing fails is progressively more costly, the probability of fails should decline at a decreasing rate. Although two-day fails are twice as costly as one-day fails, one-day fails are somewhat less than twice as likely as two-day fails. Treasury bill prices should be bid up at a progressively decreasing rate.
One way to test this is to write:
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm Table 5 ; 3t
we expect -y2 and -y3 to be positive.
Taking logs, we obtain the regression equation:
where the b estimate the corresponding -y or 6.
In increasing effort to generate them, the net effect on the probability of fails depends on the relative costs of preventing and generating fails.
Other factors also influence the failure rate. For example, more fails occur if Fedwire closes on time, both because dealers have less time to fix errors and because more deliveries miss the cutoff time.
Although more liquid issues are less likely to fail, heavy total trading volume (for all issues) leads to more delivery failures. Dealers have more work to do but no more time in which to do it, leading to more errors and congestion on Fedwire. Finally, improvements in technology should lead to fewer fails. Given that trading volume increased dramatically during our sample while technology also advanced, it is not possible to determine the net effect a priori. We note, though, that the Federal Reserve has taken preliminary steps to obtain information on delivery failure rates, indicating that problems remain.
VI. The E f f e c t of F a i l s on the Bid-Ask Spread
We have seen that dealers build inventory throughout the day to We conjecture that this has two effects. First, it may affect trading volume. The data do not permit testing this. Second, dealers may require larger expected profits on transactions if the potential www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm fail is longer. To test this, we regress the bid-ask spread on a constant and the length of the potential fail:
If the scenario above is true and dealers do require larger profits when the risk of fails is larger, the spread should widen as D increases.
The coefficient bl should be positive. Since failing to make delivery amounts to making an interest-free loan to the buyer, the spread should also be a function of the level of rates. Therefore, we also estimate:
where qt is the average of the bid and ask discounts at time t. Table 7 contains the results. Consistent with our conjecture, b in equation 1 (14) is indeed positive and significantly different from zero. The t-ratio is 2.06; using a chi-square test with White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent estimator, the statistic equals 4.00, which is also significant at the 5 percent level. Equation (15) also supports the conjecture that dealers require larger spreads as the length of a potential fail increases. Both bl and b2 are positive and significant. This evidence in favor of fails is more persuasive when one recalls Table 1 ; the variation in the spread cannot be attributed to some general weekly pattern, because the spread does not depend on the day of the week in our sample.
VII . Summary
This paper studies the effect of failed delivery on Treasury bill prices. We find that Treasury bill prices reflect the value of being failed. Prices increase if the scheduled delivery date falls before a market closing, lengthening the time before a fail can be corrected. We interpret this result as supporting the hypothesis that buyers compete www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm for the possibility of collecting fails, bidding up the prices of bills to be delivered before market closings. Because sellers should invest progressively more resources to prevent fails as the opportunity cost of fails increases, the probability of fails should fall as the opportunity cost rises. Tests of this are inconclusive: the four coefficients for the different opportunity costs of fails are not statistically significant, but the ranks of their magnitudes are almost exactly as predicted, and all four are positive, as required by the theory.
Finally, we find that the bid-ask spread widens as the length of a potential fail increases. This is consistent with the interpretation that fails add another source of risk to a transaction.
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm Footnotes 1. These procedures are from Stigum (1983 Stigum ( , 1988 .
2. Fails in physical securities are much more common than in book-entry securities. However, it is much less reasonable to expect fails in physical securities to be corrected in one business day. Therefore, we are unable to test for the effect of fails in such assets.
3. We discuss this and the construction of our data in the appendix.
4. Sellers may well take extra care to avoid fails before weekends, reducing the premium to less than three times the usual amount.
However, if progressively lowering the fail rate is increasingly costly, the multiday premium must exceed the one-day premium. The comments of dealers were mixed: most reported that their employees were especially concerned with multiday fails, but a few were compelled to constantly remind employees of the potential cost.
5. The sample for this test extends from June 2, 1978 because DRI did not supply bid and ask quotes until then. Prior to that date, DRI reported only the average of the bid and ask quotes.
6. We also conducted tests using bid-to-bid and ask-to-ask returns on different Treasury bill data from another source. Although not reported here, the results are consistent with those reported below using the mean of the bid and ask quotes.
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm The X2 tests the restriction that the dummy variables are zero using White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent estimator. The test has one degree of freedom. None of the values is significant at the 5 percent level.
** Significant at the 1 percent level.
The sample period begins on June 2, 1978 because DRI does not report bid and ask discount quotes until then.
Source: Authors' computations.
TABLE 2
Sample statistics Panel A: Sample statistics for Treasury bill holding-period returns, returns on an investment in federal funds during the holding period, the length of the fail period, returns on an investment in federal funds during the fail period, and the change in returns on an investment in federal funds during the fail period.
Full Sample: August 26, 1977 -September 28, 1989 . ffDt = the opportunity cost of a fail at t. AffDt = the change in the opportunity cost of a fail from t-n to t.
Source: Authors' computations. A ffn = the predicted value of the return on an investment in federal funds during the holding period.
A AffD = the predicted value of the change in the opportunity cost of a fail from t-n to t.
The Z(t) statistics test the hypothesis that the corresponding adjusted t-ratio differs from unity. These adjusted statistics are given in Perron (1988) . The critical one percent values given by Fuller (1976) are -2.58, -3.43, and -3.96 for ( t : ) , Z(tQ*), and Z(t--), respectively. Z(1) tests the * * joint hypothesis of p = 0, a = 1. Z(2) tests the joint hypothesis of = 0, ---, 6' = 0, a = 1. Z(3) tests the joint hypothesis of B = 0 , a = 1. The critical one percent values given by Dickey and Fuller (1981) for these tests are 6.43, 6.09, and 8.27, respectively. All statistics use the variance estimator given by Newey and West (1987) . The truncation lag is 5 for the estimates given, but other values for the truncation lag give similar results. A ffnt = the predicted return on federal funds during the holding period at t A AffD. = the predicted value of the change in the opportunity cost of a fail from t-n to t.
The Q(j) statistics are the Box-Pierce (1970) statistics for an autoregressive or moving average process of order j. These statistics are distributed chi-square with j degrees of freedom.
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm TABLE 5 Estimates obtained by regressing Treasury bill holding-period returns on the predicted return on federal funds over the holding period, the change in the predicted value of the opportunity cost of a fail from t-n to t, and interactive variables controlling for the divergence between the proportion of the federal funds rate earned by Treasury-bill investors on Wednesdays and Thursdays compared to other days of the week, corrected for autocorrelation.
( ** Significant at the 1 percent level.
Source: Authors' computations. ffDlt, ffD2t, ffD3t, ffD4 = the predicted return on federal funds during t the length of a fail at time t (fails of five days are included with fails of four days because only two exist in the sample).
Source: Authors' computations. Bid = the bid discount on day t, in percent. t Askt = the ask discount on day t, in percent Dt = the number of days in the fail period on day t. qt = the average of the bid and ask discount rates on day t, in percent.
The X2 tests the restriction that the dummy variables are zero using White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent estimator. The test has one degree of freedom.
* Significant at the 5 percent level. ** Significant at the 1 percent level.
where Pt is the price at t, q is the quoted discount rate in percent, and (m-s) is the number of days -from the promised delivery date until maturity. These prices are then used to compute log-price ratios for the test equations. Maturities range from 27 to 35 days. We choose this maturity range for several reasons. First, it approximates one month, the maturity often used as the proxy for the riskless rate. In addition, this minimizes problems with differential seasoning, causes
Monday's maturity to be as near the mean as possible, and causes any term premium to bias our tests against finding an effect due to fails.
To verify that the time series of Treasury bill prices is as accurate as is possible, we use numerous manual and computer procedures. A complete listing of these is available from the authors.
We illustrate the construction of the data by describing a week unaffected by holidays. Monday's holding-period return is computed using Friday's price on a 34-day bill and Monday's price on that same bill, which has 31 days until maturity on Monday. Tuesday's return uses Monday's and Tuesday's prices on the same bill (which has 30 days until maturity on Tuesday), and Wednesday's return uses Tuesday's and Wednesday's prices on the same bill. Thursday's return is the last one using this same bill, representing the return on a bill with 28 days until maturity at the end of the holding period. Friday's return uses a new bill (maturing a week later), with 35 days until maturity on Thursday and 34 on Friday. Thus, any liquidity premium would cause Thursday's average return to be the lowest and Friday's to be the highest. Since fails would cause exactly the opposite result in the absence of holidays, constructing the data in this way biases our tests against finding that fails are important.
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm -3 6 -This approach offers two advantages over assuming a locally flat term structure and using yields to compute implied prices. First, our method need not impose any specific shape on the yield curve. More important, our method obtains returns that actually could have been earned by investors. This is not the case using implied prices, which sometimes use yields on two different securities to calculate returns.
Flannery and Protopapadakis (1988) discuss these return measures.
